What the Anti-Hamas Protests in Gaza Actually Mean

Demonstrations against Hamas erupted on March 25 in the northern Gaza Strip and spread since then to other parts of the territory. Three common themes can be easily detected in the demands of the demonstrators: a cry for help, a demand to let Gazans live and have access to food; an end to the war and the death, displacement, and the threats of expulsion it creates; and most notably a demand for Hamas to step down and leave governance to others. It should be clear from the outset that in the eyes of the demonstrators, these three demands are linked, even if many of the written signs raised during these demonstrations do not explicitly state the link. 

While some view these demonstrations as a genuine popular uprising against Hamas which could undermine the Palestinian movement’s control over Gaza, the Islamist group sees them as a desperate attempt by its external enemies to use local agents to create a false impression that a revolt to its rule is underway. Both assertions are partially correct and partially wrong. The resumption of the war, accompanied this time by the threat of expulsion, shifted Gazans' sentiments toward Hamas. However, high levels of national and religious loyalty—and few political alternatives—limit the choices at hand for Palestinians.

There is no doubt that many Gazans are opposed to Hamas. As the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, I have studied public opinion in Gaza for decades and to be sure, Hamas has never in its entire history had a majority support in Gaza. Our surveys, which started in 1993, covering both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, were all conducted face to face with representative samples of Palestinians of at least 1,200 adult respondents, including 400 or more people from the Gaza Strip. We estimate that the margin of error for our surveys is about 3%, but over time, they have consistently shown that many Palestinians do not support Hamas.

In fact, in July 2023, thousands, mostly young Palestinians, marched across the Gaza Strip in a rare show of anger with Hamas and discontent with living conditions. In November 2021, 51% of Gazans told us, in an Arab Barometer survey, that they had run out of food and lacked the money to buy more during the past 30 days. But a few days before October 7, 2023, that percentage increased to three quarters. Not surprisingly, trust in the Hamas-led government at that time stood at only 29%. 

As living conditions in Gaza have worsened considerably after Oct. 7, due to the continued war and lack of access to food and other essentials, Hamas gradually became less popular. The findings of several surveys I have conducted before and after Oct. 7 clearly demonstrate that. In Sept. 2023, 38% of Gazans said that they support Hamas. And this level declined a year later to 35%. Nonetheless, none of rival political factions received greater support than that, with Hamas’ main domestic political rival, Fatah, receiving the support of only 25% of Palestinians just before Oct. 7 and 29% a year later. Given the little change in this domestic balance of power, before and after Oct. 7, it is highly unlikely that these numbers have changed significantly in recent months.

It is true that Gazan public perception regarding the war and its consequences has shifted significantly since the early weeks after Oct. 7. These shifts have drastically damaged Hamas’ narrative. For instance, the perception among Gazans that Hamas’ decision to launch its attack against Israel on Oct. 7 was correct dropped from 57% in late Nov. 2023 to 39% in late 2024. During that same period, the perception that Hamas will win the war on Gaza dropped from 50% to 26%; the expectation that Hamas will continue to control the Gaza Strip after the end of the war dropped from 51% to 37%; satisfaction with Hamas’ performance during the war dropped from 52% to 39%; and the preference for continued Hamas control dropped from 38% to 36%. 

Yet, during that same period, the preference to replace Hamas’ control with that of the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) rose from 16% to only 27%—less than the preference for a Hamas control. In fact, in Sept. 2024 we asked the public specifically about their support for the return of the PA to the Gaza Strip to control the recently Israeli reoccupied and closed Rafah Crossing, the border terminal that links the Gaza Strip to Egypt from which international aid is delivered and access to the world is provided. And even in this context, only 42% of Gazans said they would support the PA.

For all of this, any denial of the genuine nature of the grievances of the demonstrators, and most importantly their belief that if Hamas leaves the governance scene, the war might stop and life might improve, is misplaced and reflects serious miscalculation. But the belief that such demonstrations pose a threat to continued Hamas control over the Gaza Strip is also misplaced and reflects an erroneous reading of reality. Our surveys clearly show that the overwhelming majority of Gazans blame Israel and the U.S. for their suffering; only one in five puts the blame on Hamas. Focus groups and in-depth interviews I have supervised clearly reveal that despite the tremendous criticism of Hamas, Gazans are fully aware that even if that group leaves the governance scene immediately, there is no viable alternative that can enforce some level of order, manage the critically needed civil defense units and health sector, ensure a relatively secure environment for humanitarian service delivery, allow markets to operate, and prevent the eruption of tremendous chaos and open anarchy and violence. 

So, why demonstrate? 

One way to help us understand these demonstrations is to ask about the timing: Why now? Four developments in March 2025 seem to illustrate the immediate impetus for the motivation to rise against Hamas. Early in the month, Israel stopped international aid organizations from delivering badly needed food to Gazans. In mid-March, Israel resumed its war against the Gaza Strip. A few days later, the Israeli army ordered residents of Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun, where the anti-Hamas demonstrations first erupted, to evacuate their homes. At that time, the Israeli defense minister threatened to annex parts of Gaza and expel its population if Hamas did not release the Israeli hostages. Days after that, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved the establishment of a "Voluntary Emigration Bureau for Gaza residents interested in relocating to third countries." 

These developments have created an environment of horror, instilled fear in the hearts of highly vulnerable residents who have just returned to their homes’ ruins after more than a year of displacement, and convinced them that they have nothing to lose. Under these conditions, it is easy to see why some people might have concluded that if Hamas goes now, the war would then stop and living conditions improve. While the hundreds or even thousands of demonstrators might believe that, it is highly unlikely that many more Gazans share this view. Israel’s strategy since the start of the war has been to ensure that there is no viable alternative to govern Gaza after Hamas is eradicated. And many Gazans understand that their displacement can take place only under one of two conditions: a full Israel reoccupation of the Gaza Strip or the engenderment of total anarchy.